Formal Avenue for Chasing Metamorphic Malware

Mila Dalla Preda University of Verona, Italy Joint work with Roberto Giacobazzi, Saumya Debray, Arun Lakhotia presented by Isabella Mastroeni

CREST, May 30th 2013

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MALWARE = MALICIOUS SOFTWARE

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Malware detector

Is a program ${\mathcal D}$ that determines whether a program ${\it P}$ is malicious

 $\mathcal{D}(P) = \begin{cases} true & \text{if } \mathcal{D} \text{ determines that } P \text{ is malicious} \\ false & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

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
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An ideal malware detector is sound and complete:

• Sound = no false positives (no false alarms)

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An ideal malware detector is sound and complete:

- SOUND = no false positives (no false alarms)
- COMPLETE = no false negatives (no missed alarms)

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Standard malware detectors: Signature Checking

Identify a sequence of instructions which is unique to a malware (virus signature) then scan programs for signatures

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BY DYNAMICALLY MODIFYING MALWARE STRUCTURE!

ESCAPE SIGNATURE CHECKING

Polymorphic malware

The malware code is encrypted and contains a decryption routine that decrypts the code and then executes it.

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
ESCAPE SIGNATURE CHECKING

Polymorphic malware

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Metamorphic malware

The malware applies semantics-preserving transformations (e.g. obfuscations) to mutate its own code as it propagates.



EQUIVALENT CODE REPLACEMENT

MOV EAX, [X] MOV EBX, [Y] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX XOR EAX, EAX ADD EAX, [X] ADD EAX, [Y] MOV [X], EAX

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EQUIVALENT CODE REPLACEMENT

MOV EAX, [X] MOV EBX, [Y] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX

XOR EAX, EAX ADD EAX, [X] ADD EAX, [Y] MOV [X], EAX

REGISTER RENAMING

MOV EAX, [X] MOV EBX, [Y] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX MOV ECX, [X] MOV EAX, [Y] ADD ECX, EAX MOV [X], ECX

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CODE REORDERING

MOV EAX, [X] MOV EBX, [Y] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX MOV EBX, [Y] MOV EAX, [X] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX

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MOV EAX, [X] MOV EBX, [Y] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX MOV EBX, [Y] MOV EAX, [X] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX

GARBAGE INSERTION

MOV EAX, [X] MOV EBX, [Y] ADD EAX, EBX MOV [X], EAX MOV EAX, [X] MOV EBX, [Y] ADD EAX, EBX PUSH, ESI MOV [X], EAX POP ESI




Figure 3 Number of malware variants for Android

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CHASING METAMORPHISM

In order to detect metamorphic malware variants malware detector should be based on **SEMANTIC** program features.

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- Abstract models of malware that ideally capture the essence of being malicious while abstracting from the details that are modified by metamorphism;
 - system call, symbolic names, automata, cfg, rewriting rules towards normal forms, model checking....

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A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE OF THE METAMORPHIC TRANSFORMATIONS

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
THE PROBLEM

Is there a way for systematically extracting a metamorphic signature without a priori knowledge of the metamorphic transformations used?

Motivation

The Problem

DEALLY ...



Program Evolution Graph

A precise description of the evolution of the code during execution

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
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Motivation

The Problem

DEALLY ...



Program Evolution Graph

A precise description of the evolution of the code during execution

Given a self-modifying program P_0 we would like to generate its program evolution graph (or a sound approximation)

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• The ME is part of the code of the metamorphic malware

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The state contains a description of the program that is executed



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We use Abstract Interpretation!

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
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The Idea


TRACE SEMANTICS

Trace semantics of a metamorphic program P



Fix-point computation of trace semantics $\llbracket P \rrbracket = lfpF_P \in \wp(\Sigma^*)$ where $F_P : \wp(\Sigma^*) \to \wp(\Sigma^*)$

 Isolate code evolution from the semantics of the metamorphic malware while abstracting from regular computation




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IDEA

Extracting metamorphic signatures is approximating malware semantics


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PHASE SEMANTICS



We define a function $F_P^{\sharp} : \wp(Progr^*) \to \wp(Progr^*)$ whose fix-point computation $\llbracket P \rrbracket^{\sharp} = IfpF_P^{\sharp} \in \wp(Progr^*)$ returns all the possible paths of the program evolution graph


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PHASE SEMANTICS




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Phase semantics
$$\llbracket P \rrbracket^{\sharp} = \mathit{lfpF}_P^{\sharp} \in \wp(\mathit{Progr}^*)$$

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PHASE SEMANTICS

Idea: collect the computation that belong to the same malware version



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NEED TO APPROXIMATE ...

Phase semantics is an AI of trace semantics with no loss of precision, given $\langle \wp(\Sigma^*), \subseteq \rangle \xleftarrow{\gamma^{\sharp}}{\alpha^{\sharp}} \langle \wp(Progr^*), \subseteq \rangle$: $\alpha^{\sharp}(Ifp\mathcal{F}_P) = Ifp\mathcal{F}_P^{\sharp}$

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CONCRETE TEST FOR METAMORPHISM

Q is a metamorphic variant of P_0 iff $\exists P_0 P_1 \dots P_n \in [\![P_0]\!]^{\sharp}, \exists i \in [0, n] : P_i = Q$ no false positives, no false negatives

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Phase semantics is precise but undecidable

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Phase semantics is precise but undecidable

Need to design suitable abstract domains for the approximation of phase semantics!!!

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ABSTRACTING METAMORPHISM

• Design GC:
$$\langle \wp(Progr^*), \subseteq \rangle \xrightarrow{\gamma_A} \langle A, \leq_A \rangle$$

• Interpret the fix-point computation of phase semantics on the abstract domain *A*:

 $\alpha_{\mathcal{A}}(\llbracket \mathcal{P} \rrbracket^{\sharp}) \leq_{\mathcal{A}} \llbracket \mathcal{P} \rrbracket^{\mathcal{A}}$

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Abstract phase semantics $\llbracket P \rrbracket^A$ can be used as a metamorphic signature

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
ABSTRACT TEST FOR METAMORPHISM

Q is a metamorphic variant of *P* wrt *A* iff $\alpha_A(Q) \leq_A [\![P]\!]^A$ no false negatives


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PHASES AS FSA

Code abstraction $\mathring{\alpha}$: *Progr* \rightarrow *FSA*



8: mov MEM[f], MEM[4]
9: mov MEM[f+1], MEM[5]
10: mov MEM[f+2], encode(goto 6)
11: mov 4, encode(nop)
12: mov 5, encode(goto MEM[f])
13: mov f, MEM[f]+3
14: goto 2



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PHASE SEMANTICS AS TRACES OF FSA


- Define a correct static approximation of the iteration function F^{FSA} : $\wp(FSA^*) \rightarrow \wp(FSA^*)$
- We derive a sound approximation of the phase semantics on the domain of traces of FSA:

$$\mathring{\alpha}(\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket^{\sharp}) \leq_{FSA} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket^{FSA} \in \wp(FSA^*)$$

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PHASE SEMANTICS AS TRACES OF FSA



WIDENING PHASES: REGULAR METAMORPHISM

Collapsing a trace of FSA into a single FSA:

• $\langle FSA /_{\equiv}, \sqsubseteq_{FSA} \rangle$ where $A_1 \sqsubseteq_{FSA} A_2 \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{L}(A_1) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(A_2)$

• let \mathbf{W}_P be the limit of the widening sequence: $W_0 = \mathring{\alpha}(P)$ $W_{i+1} = W_i \triangledown F_P^{FSA}(W_i)$

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• let W_P be the limit of the widening sequence: $W_0 = \mathring{\alpha}(P)$ $W_{i+1} = W_i \triangledown F_P^{FSA}(W_i)$

Abstract test for metamorphism on $FSA/_{\equiv}$


Q is a metamorphic variant of *P* wrt $FSA/_{\equiv}$ iff $ABS(Q) \sqsubseteq_{FSA} W_P$ no false negatives

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WIDENING PHASES: REGULAR METAMORPHISM



Spurious trace: mov f, 100; input => a; MEM[a] mod 2 = 0; MEM[b]:= MEM[a]; goto; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]....

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What we have done:

- A precise model of metamorphic code evolution named phase semantics
- Requires no a priori knowledge about the metamorphic engine
- A method for approximating the Phase semantics
- A computable approximation of regular metamorphism

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WHAT'S NEXT

- Suitable for semi-automatic malware analysis: generation-test-refine
- Abstract interpretation based learning
- More advanced abstractions: e.g., context free metamorphism
- Design of new abstract domain for the analysis of code variants


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METAPHOR: TOY EXAMPLE

P = mov e, 10PUSH MÓV POP PUSI PO PUSH PUSH

Approximated rules: push; pop $\rightarrow mov$ mov; mov \rightarrow mov



Compression rules:

push e2; pop e1 \rightarrow mov e1,e2 mov e2,e1; push e2 \rightarrow push e1 pop e2; mov e1, e2 \rightarrow pop e1

> mov mov, mov push, pop mov, mov, mov mov, push, pop push,pop,mov mov, mov, mov, mov mov, mov, push, pop mov, push, pop, mov push, pop, push, pop

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LEARNING ME

Joint work with Arun Lakhotia

- BinJuice a tool for binary control flow graph comparison
- Virus Evol
- Extract syntactic differences between the control flow graph of successive variants (365 rules)
- Keep only semantic preserving rules
- Reduce rules (65 rules)
- Captures only block transformations, not structure transformations!