Automatically Finding Patches Using Genetic Programming

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Motivation

- Software Quality remains a key problem
 - Over one half of 1 percent of US GDP each year [NIST02]
 - The cost of fixing a defect increases (\$25 \$16k) [IBM08]
 - Even security-critical bugs take 28 days (avg) [Symantec06]
 - Despite bug detection and test suites
 - Programs ship with known bugs
- How can we reduce debugging costs?
 - Bug reports accompanied by patches are addressed more rapidly
- Thus: Automated Patch Generation

Main Claim

- We can automatically and efficiently repair certain classes of bugs in off-the-shelf, unannotated legacy programs.
- Basic idea: Biased search through the space of certain nearby programs until you find a variant that repairs the problem. Key insights:
 - Use existing **test cases** to evaluate variants.
 - Search by perturbing parts of the program **likely** to contain the error.

ICSE'09 Best Paper, GECCO'09 Best Paper, SBST'09 Best Short Paper, 2009 IFIP TC2 Manfred Paul Award, 2009 Gold Human-Competitive Award

Repair Process Preview

• Input:

- The program source code
- System/regression tests passed by the program
- A test case failed by the program (= the bug)
- Genetic Programming Work:
 - Create variants of the program
 - Run them on the test cases
 - Repeat, retaining and combining variants
- Output:
 - New program source code that passes all tests
 - or "no solution found in time"

This Talk

- Fixing Real Bugs In Real Programs
 - Representation and Operations
- The Quality of Automated Repairs
 - Self-Healing Systems and Metrics
- Test Suite Selection
 - Success and Explanations
- Open Questions in Automated Repair

Genetic Programming

- Genetic programming is the application of evolutionary or genetic algorithms to program source code.
 - Representing a population of program variants
 - Mutation and crossover operations
 - Fitness function
- GP serves as a search heuristic
 - Others (random search, brute force, etc.) also work
- Similar in ways to search-based software engineering:
 - Regression tests to guide the search

Useful Insight #1 - Where To Fix

- In a large program, not every line is equally likely to contribute to the bug.
- Fault localization: given a bug, find its location in the program source.
- Insight: since we have the test cases, run them and collect coverage information.
- The bug is more likely to be found on lines visited when running the failed test case.
- The bug is less likely to be found on lines visited when running the passed test cases.

Useful Insight #2 - How To Fix

- Developers often use statements or lines of code as atomic units representing actions
- Insight: operate on statements or lines
 - Not on assembly ops or expressions
 - Factor of 10 reduction in search space each time
- Insight: do not invent new code
 - Instead, copy and modify existing statements
- We assume the program "contains the seeds of its own repair"
 - e.g., has another null check somewhere

Fault Localization Formalism

- We define a weighted path to be a list of <statement, weight> pairs.
- We use this weighted path:
 - The statements are those visited during the failed test case.
 - The weight for a statement S is
 - High (1.0) if S is not visited on a passed test
 - Low (0.0-0.1) if S is also visited on a passed test
 - (Other weight sources are possible: e.g., Cooperative Bug Isolation or Daikon predicates)

Genetic Programming for Program Repair: Mutation

- Population of Variants:
 - Each variant is an <AST, weighted path> pair
- Mutation:
 - To mutate a variant $V = \langle AST_v, wp_v \rangle$, choose a statement S from wp_v biased by the weights
 - **Replacement**. Replace S with S1
 - Insertion. Replace S with { S2 ; S }
 - **Deletion**. Replace S with { }
 - Choose S1 and S2 from the entire AST
 - All variants retain weighted path length

Genetic Programming for Program Repair: Fitness

- Compile a variant
 - If it fails to compile, Fitness = 0
 - Otherwise, run it on the test cases
 - Fitness = number of test cases passed
 - Weighted: passing the bug test case is worth more
- Selection and Crossover
 - Higher fitness variants are retained and combined into the next generation
 - Tournament selection and one-point crossover
- Repeat until a solution is found



Example: Abstract Syntax Tree



Example: Weighted Path (1/3)



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Example: Weighted Path (2/3)



Example: Weighted Path (3/3)



Example: Mutation (1/2)



Mutation Source: Anywhere in AST Mutation Destination: Weighted Path

Example: Mutation (2/2)



Mutation Source: Anywhere in AST Mutation Destination: Weighted Path

Example: Final Repair



Minimize The Repair

- Repair Patch is a diff between orig and variant
- Mutations may add unneeded statements
 - (e.g., dead code, redundant computation)
- In essence: try removing each line in the diff and check if the result still passes all tests
- Delta Debugging finds a 1-minimal subset of the diff in $O(n^2)$ time
 - Removing any single line causes a test to fail
- We use a tree-structured diff algorithm (diffX)
 - Avoids problems with balanced curly braces, etc.

Experimental Results: 20 Repairs

	Lines of Code					# of
Program	Repaired	Total	Program Description	Defect Repaired	Time	Fitness
gcd	22	-	Euclid's algorithm	infinite loop	276 s	909
zune	28	-	MS Zune example	infinite loop	$78 \mathrm{\ s}$	460
tiff	1084	84067	image processing	segfault	$45 \mathrm{s}$	280
uniq	1146	-	text processing	segfault	32 s	139
look-ultrix	1169	-	dictionary lookup	segfault	42 s	120
look-svr4	1363	-	dictionary lookup	infinite loop	$51 \mathrm{s}$	42
units	1504	-	metric conversion	segfault	$1528 \mathrm{\ s}$	9014
deroff	2236	-	document processing	segfault	132 s	227
nullhttpd	5575	-	threaded webserver	heap buff. overflow †	$1394 \mathrm{~s}$	1800
openldap	6159	308777	authentication server	non-overflow D.O.S. †	$665 \mathrm{~s}$	8
ccrypt	6413	7515	Rijndael cryptography	segfault	$330 \mathrm{~s}$	32
leukocyte	6718	-	computational biology	segfault	$544 \mathrm{~s}$	12
indent	9906	-	pretty printing	infinite loop	$7614 \mathrm{~s}$	13628
python	11227	496527	web app. interpreter	overflow error	$1393 \mathrm{~s}$	23222
lighttpd	13984	51895	webserver CGI	heap buff. overflow †	$395 \mathrm{s}$	52
imagemagick	16851	450416	image processing	incorrect image output	1240 s	131
flex	18775	-	scanner generator	segfault	4660 s	9560
atris	21553	-	graphical game	stack buff. overflow †	84 s	285
php	26044	797749	web app. interpreter	integer overflow †	$2678~{\rm s}$	18081
wu-ftpd	35109	-	FTP server	format string vuln. †	$5397 \mathrm{~s}$	74
total or avg	186,866	2,302,050	(20 distinct programs)	(20 defects in 8 classes)	1428 s	3903

Many defects from "black hat" lists; avg minimization time: 12 seconds. 21

The Story Thus Far

- How does the approach work?
 - Create programs in a **restricted** search space
- Can it produce repairs?
 - Yes, for many types of programs and defects

- Can I afford to use it?
 - Are the repairs trustworthy?
 - Does the approach scale?

Repair Quality

- Repairs are typically *not* what a human would have done
 - Example: our technique adds bounds checks to one particular network read, rather than refactoring to use a safe abstract string class in multiple places
- Recall: any proposed repair must pass all regression test cases
 - When POST test is omitted from nullhttpd, the generated repair eliminates POST functionality
 - Tests ensure we do not sacrifice functionality
 - Minimization prevents gratuitous deletions
 - Adding more tests helps rather than hurting

Repair Quality Experiment

- A high-quality repair ...
 - Retains required functionality
 - Does not introduce new bugs
 - Is not a "fragile memorization" of the buggy input
 - Works as part of an entire system
- If humans are present, they can inspect it
- Let's consider a human-free situation, such as:
 - A long-running server with an anomaly intrusion detection system that will generate and deploy repairs for all detected anomalies.

Repair Quality Benchmarks

- Two webservers with buffer overflows
 - nullhttpd (simple, multithreaded)
 - lighttpd (used by Wikimedia, etc.)
 - 138,226 requests from 12,743 distinct client IP addresses (held out; one day of data)
- One web application language interpreter
 - **php** (integer overflow vulnerability)
 - 15kloc secure reservation system web app
 - 12,375 requests (held out; one day of data)

Repair Quality Experimental Setup

- Apply indicative workloads to vanilla servers
 - Record result contents and times
- Send attack input
 - Caught by anomaly intrusion detection system
- Generate and deploy repair
 - Using attack input and six test cases
- Apply indicative workload to patched server
 - Each request must yield exactly the same output (bit-per-bit) in the same time or less!

Closed-Loop Outcomes

Case	Anomaly Detected?	Successful Repair?	Result
1	True Neg.	N/A	Legitimate request handled correctly; no repair
2	False Neg.	N/A	Attack succeeds; Repair not attempted
3	True Pos.	Yes	Attack stopped and bug fixed. Later requests could be lost if repair breaks functionality
4	True Pos.	No	Attack detected; bug not repaired
5	False Pos.	No	Legitimate request dropped; repair not found
6	False Pos.	Yes	Legitimate request dropped; later requests may be harmed if "repair" is incorrect

Repair Quality Results

Program	Requests Lost Making Repair	Requests Lost to Repair Quality
nullhttpd	2.38% ± 0.83%	0.00% ± 0.25%
lighttpd	0.98% ± 0.11%	0.03% ± 1.53%
php	0.12% ± 0.00%	0.02% ± 0.02%

Repair Quality Results

Program	Requests Lost Making Repair	Requests Lost to Repair Quality	General Fuzz Tests Failed	Exploit Fuzz Tests Failed
nullhttpd	2.38% ± 0.83%	0.00% ± 0.25%	$0 \rightarrow 0$	10 → 0
lighttpd	0.98% ± 0.11%	0.03% ± 1.53%	1410 → 1410	$9 \rightarrow 0$
php	0.12% ± 0.00%	0.02% ± 0.02%	$3 \rightarrow 3$	$5 \rightarrow 0$

Repair Quality Results

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lighttpd	0.98% ± 0.11%	0.03% ± 1.53%	1410 → 1410	$9 \rightarrow 0$
php	0.12% ± 0.00%	0.02% ± 0.02%	$3 \rightarrow 3$	$5 \rightarrow 0$
nullhttpd False Pos #1	7.83% ± 0.49%	0.00% ± 2.22%	$0 \rightarrow 0$	n/a
nullhttpd False Pos #2	3.04% ± 0.29%	0.57% ± 3.91%	$0 \rightarrow 0$	n/a
nullhttpd False Pos #3	6.92% ± 0.09% (no repair!)	n/a	n/a	n/a

Repair Quality Conclusions

- It is possible to create repairs that
 - Retain required functionality
 - Do not introduce new bugs
 - Are not a fragile memorizations
 - Work as part of an entire system
- This reduces to the problem of supplying a good test suite
- For webservers and php, a few indicative endto-end system tests suffice
 - But in general we may need more test cases ...

Algorithm Scalability

- We want to quickly produce high-quality repairs for complicated defects in large programs with arbitrary test suites
- GP is a heuristic search strategy
- Worst-case run time is effectively
 - Size of search space multipled by
 - Time to evaluate a point in the search space
- Examine fitness cost first, then search space

Fitness Scalability

- 1000 fitness evaluations means 1000 complete runs of your test suite
 - This task can be done in parallel (two ways)
- We view it as an advantage that we can repair programs with only a few test cases
- But we want to scale to more larger test suites
- For both performance and correctness
 - Test cases encode required behavior!

Test Suite Purposes

- Thus far, the full test suite determines:
 - Do we keep this variant in the next generation?
 - Is this a candidate repair that passes all tests?
- Insight: split these tasks
 - Use a small subset of tests to decide "keep/drop"
 - GP structure allows noise
 - Use the full suite to evaluate candidate repairs

Test Suite Selection

- Can choose subset at random or by some other metric (e.g., max coverage, min time)
- In intermediate steps, poor test selection:
 - Retains variants that should be dropped
 - Drops variants that should be kept (rare)
 - Distorts the view of the fitness landscape
- Thus requiring more generations
- Does the time saved in fitness evaluations exceed the cost of being "led astray" ?

Tests Suite Selection Algorithms

- Random Subset
 - Pick next test at random without replacement
- Time-Aware Test Suite Prioritization
 - Includes test time and test coverage (Walcott, Soffa, Kapfhammer, Roos. ISSTA'06)
- Greedy Coverage
 - Pick next test to maximize coverage gains

Test Suite Selection Results

• 10 programs, each with 100+ test cases

	Total	Module	#		
Program	LOC	LOC	Tests	Test Suite Description	Defect Description
deroff utx 4.3	2236	2236	100	fuzz input (as typesetting directives)	segfault
look utx 4.3	1169	1169	100	fuzz input (for both needle and haystack strings)	segfault
uniq utx 4.3	1146	1146	100	fuzz input (as duplicate-containing text file)	segfault
zune	28	28	100	fuzz input (as days since 1 January 1980)	infinite loop
gcd	22	22	100	fuzz input (as pairs of integers)	infinite loop
lighttpd $1.4.15$	51895	3829	200	HTTP requests from cs.virginia.edu	buffer overrun
nullhttpd $0.5.0$	5575	5575	200	HTTP requests from cs.virginia.edu	buffer overrun
leukocyte	6718	6718	100	video microscopy images	segfault
tiff 3.8.2	84067	1084	106	image suite bundled with tifflib	segfault
imagemagick $6.5.2$	450416	5858	100	images from pngsuite test suite	wrong output
total	603272	27665	1206		

• Selection reduces time-to-repair by 81%

- Yields equivalent-quality repairs
- leukocyte with 100 tests: 90 mins to 6 mins
- imagemagick with 100 tests: 36 mins to 3 mins

Test Suite Selection Explained

- Small changes between variants mean most variants have similar test case behavior
 - True. However, an optimal safe impact analysis could only reduce time-to-repair by 29% (cf. 81%)
- The test cases are all dependent, and thus running one is as good as running another
 - False. There was only a 3% performance increase between high-overlap and low-overlap suites.
- The fitness function can tolerate noise
 - True. Test suite selection on gcd distorts the fitness function by 27%. (cf. Fitness Distance Correlation)

Search Space Scalability

- So each variant can be evaluated rapidly
- The other factor in cost is the number of variants examined
 - i.e., the size of the search space
- This is related to fault localization precision, not overall program size
 - Since we only mutate and crossover statements along the weighted path

Search Space vs. Fault Localization



log of weighted path length

Outline

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 - Representation and Operations
- The Quality of Automated Repairs
 - Self-Healing Systems and Metrics
- Test Suite Selection
 - Success and Explanations
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Can Formal Specifications Be Used?

- Use Local Annotations in Mutation
- Typestate Repair
 - Algorithms for repairing programs with respect to a temporal safety policy
 - Provably safe with respect to that one policy
- Synthesis
 - Use GP to identify regions, not to copy statements
- Refactoring for Formal Verification
 - If repair is correct but cannot easily be verified

What Fault Localization is Possible?

- Standard approaches (e.g., Tarantula)
- Cooperative Bug Isolation
 - Instrument program with Daikon-style predicates
 - Measure which are false on normal runs but true on failing runs (etc.)
 - Have repaired a program using a weighted path induced from CBI information
- Impact on mutation operator:
 - Guide changes to flip predicates

What Mutations are Possible?

- Goal: increase "expressive power"
- Expression-level Mutation
 - Increases size of search space
 - In practice, reduces time-to-repair by 30%

- "x=3;" vs. "x=0; x++; x++; x++;"

- "Typed" Repair Templates
 - "if (local_ptr != NULL) { local_stmt(local_ptr); }"
 - Manually crafted or mined automatically
 - Distance metric on changes

Can We Handle Threads?

- Currently we assume a deterministic fitness function and the ability to localize faults.
- VM Integration
 - Add scheduler constraints to the representation
 - Repair = code changes plus scheduler directives
- Context-Bounded
 - Existing tools can prove the presence or absence of race conditions assuming at most *k* thread interleavings

Can We Do More Than Repair?

- Evolutionary approaches are traditionally strong at small optimization and synthesis
- Vertex and Pixel Shaders
 - Small C programs used by modern graphics cards
 - Optimize for space or speed
 - Can be "10% blurrier" than original
 - What is "fault localization" here?

Is Our Fitness Function Reasonable?

- A good fitness function increases for more desirable variants
- Ours is accurate at the extremes
 - But weak in the middle
- Correlation with an "optimal" tree structured distance metric for known repairs is ~0.3
- Can we combine test case counts with ...
 - Invariants retained, anomaly detection signals, ...

Is Competitive Coevolution Possible?

- In the security domain, white hats and black hats both want to identify the next attack as quickly as possible
- Can we simulate this "arms race"?
 - Many exploits are themselves C programs
 - For a small exploitable program we have evolved a repair, then evolved the exploit to work again, then evolved a second repair
- Automated Hardening and Synthetic Diversity
 - Repair old programs against various signals
 - Does it defeat attacks that came out later?

Conclusions

- We can automatically and efficiently repair certain classes of bugs in off-the-shelf legacy programs.
 - 20 programs totaling 186kloc in about 5 minutes each, on average
- We use regression tests to encode desired behavior.
 - Existing tests encode required behavior
- The genetic programming search focuses attention on parts of the program visited during the bug but not visited during passed test cases.

Questions

• I encourage difficult questions.

Bonus Slide: Test Cases

```
#!/bin/sh
1
  # Positive Test Case for nullhttpd (POST data)
2
3
  ulimit -t 5
  /usr/bin/wget --tries=1 --post-data 'name=my name&submit=submit'
4
5
     "http://localhost:\$PORT/cgi-bin/hello.pl"
   if diff hello.pl ../known-good-hello.pl-result ; then
6
     # if the current output matches the known-good output
7
     echo "passed hello.pl test case" >> ../list-of-tests-passed
8
9
   fi
```

Figure 2: Positive test case for nullhetpd. wget is a command-line HTTP client; ulimit cuts the test off after five seconds. The test assumes that the sandboxed webserver is accepting connections on **PORT** and has its own copy of htdocs, including cgi-bin/hello.pl. Note the oracle comparison using diff against known-good-hello.pl-result on line 6.

```
#!/bin/sh
1
  # Negative Test Case for nullhttpd
2
 ulimit -t 5
3
4 ../nullhttpd-exploit -h localhost -p $PORT -t2
5 /usr/bin/wget --tries=1 "http://localhost:$PORT/index.html"
  if diff index.html .../known-good-index.html-result ; then
6
    # if the current output matches the known-good output
7
    echo "passed exploit test case" >> ../list-of-tests-passed
8
  fi
9
```

Figure 3: Negative test case for nullhttpd. If the exploit (line 4) disables the webserver then the request for index.html (line 5) will fail.

Evolution of Zune Repair

(5 normal test cases weighing 1 each,2 buggy test cases weighing 10 each)



Generation

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